International trends in income inequality and social policy by Caminada, Koen & Goudswaard, Kees
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
International trends in income inequality
and social policy
Koen Caminada and Kees Goudswaard
Department of Economics, Leiden University
2001
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20181/
MPRA Paper No. 20181, posted 27. January 2010 17:02 UTC
  
 
 
 
International Trends in Income Inequality and Social Policy *  
 
 
 
 
Koen Caminada             and             Kees Goudswaard 
  c.l.j.caminada@law.leidenuniv.nl                      k.p.goudswaard@law.leidenuniv.nl 
 
 
Leiden University 
Public Finance Department 
P.O. Box 9521, 2300 RA Leiden 
The Netherlands 
phone: ++31 (0)71 527 7756 
fax: ++31 (0)71 512 2140 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In most OECD-countries income inequality has increased during the last two decades. In this paper, we 
investigate whether changes in the overall distribution of income can be attributed to social policy 
measures. For most (but not all) countries we find a possible relationship between changing welfare 
state policies (as measured by expenditure ratios and replacement rates) and changing income 
inequality. Especially the United Kingdom and the Netherlands combined an above-average rise in 
inequality with a reduction in the generosity of the welfare system. 
A more elaborate budget incidence analysis for the Netherlands indicates that in the period 1981-1997 
inequality of disposable household income increased sharply. The two main forces behind this 
phenomenon were a more unequal distribution of market incomes and changes in social transfers. 
Fundamental social security reforms in the Netherlands indeed seem to have made the income 
distribution less equal. However, income inequality in the Netherlands is still below the OECD average at 
the end of the observed period. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In recent years considerable progress has been made in empirical research on income 
inequality in industrialised countries (see e.g. Gottschalk, Gustafsson and Palmer eds., 1997). 
An important development has been the launching of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) in 
which micro data-sets from various countries have been harmonised. Consequently it is 
possible to study income inequality across countries (see Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding, 
1995). However, the improvement in methods of measurement and in empirical knowledge is 
in contrast with the lack of insight into causes of changes in equality over time (Gustafsson and 
Johansson, 1997).1 This should perhaps not come as a surprise as the distribution of income in 
a country is the outcome of numerous decisions made over time by households, firms, 
organisations and the public sector. One could think of an almost infinite number of micro-level 
causes for differences and changes in income inequality (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; 
Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995). 
In this paper, we investigate whether social policy measures have contributed to changes in 
income inequality among OECD countries. Our hypothesis is that reforms of the social 
system, such as benefit cuts or enforcement of stricter eligibility criteria, have made the 
income distribution more unequal. Of course, this is only so when (pre-reform-) social 
transfers are mainly directed at lower income groups (or when the transfers to lower income 
groups are cut more sharply than the transfers to higher income groups). When, on the other 
hand, the benefits of the welfare system are rather evenly spread over income classes, 
reforms will not have a strong impact on income (re)distribution. 
Using comparative international time-series data we will analyse whether there is a 
relationship between changes in social expenditures and welfare generosity, and changes in 
the distribution of income. This is mainly a descriptive analysis. A more detailed quantitative 
study will be performed for the Netherlands, which is an interesting case, because the Dutch 
welfare system has been reformed fundamentally in recent years. Also, income inequality 
has increased relatively more than in most other OECD countries (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 
1998). We use the traditional budget incidence approach – despite some methodological 
problems we will address (see Smolensky, Hoyt and Danziger, 1987) – to study the combined 
effects of all taxes and transfers on the income (re)distribution. The distribution of primary or 
wage and salary income is compared with the distribution of income after tax and after social 
transfers.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we summarise literature on the (changes in the) 
income distribution around the world, and more detailed in OECD countries. In section 3 we 
investigate the proposition that social policy is one of the causes of increasing inequality. 
Section 4 presents a more detailed budget incidence approach for the Netherlands. Section 5 
concludes the paper. Details on the data(bases) are listed in the Annex. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Föster (2000) summarises trends and driving factors in income distribution and poverty on the basis of a harmonised 
questionnaire of 21 OECD Member Countries (i.e. distribution indicators derived from national micro-economic data).. 
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2   Empirical Evidence on Income Inequality 
 
2.1   Data on Income Inequality around the World  
 
On the World Wide Web several sites can be found about the distribution of income around 
the world.2 Some contain large data-sets covering inequality indices for an wide range of 
country-studies which could be used for an international comparison of income dispersion 
over time. Deininger and Squire (1996) e.g. compiled data on income inequality for a very 
large panel of countries. Their data consist of Gini coefficients and quintile shares for 101 
countries. For most countries data are available for the period from the early 1960's to the 
early 1990's. The Deininger-Squire data-set indicates whether inequality is computed for 
income gross or net of taxes or for expenditures, and whether the income concept applies to 
individuals or households. The data for a particular country apply to a specified survey-year. 
Barro (1999) classed each observation of this data-set as 1960, 1970, 1980, or 1990, 
depending on which of these ten-year values was closest to the survey (these compiled data 
were used in regressions for growth). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the Gini 
values of the countries with two or more observations in the sample (of which 9 are in Sub 
Saharan Africa).  
 
Table 1   Descriptive Statistics for the Gini Coefficient around the World 
 
level →   Gini 1960   Gini 1970   Gini 1980   Gini 1990 
        
number of countries 49  61  68  76 
        
mean 0.432  0.416  0.394  0.409 
        
maximum 0.640  0.619  0.632  0.623 
minimum 0.253  0.228  0.210  0.227 
standard deviation 0.100  0.094  0.092  0.101 
        
change →  in the 60's  in the 70's  in the 80's  
mean Gini coefficient  -0.016  -0.022  0.015  
 
note: The years shown are the closest ten-year value to the actual date of the survey on income distribution. Deininger and 
Squire (1996) denote a subset of their data as high quality. Barro expanded this high quality sample size - at the expense 
of reduction in accuracy of measurement – with a number of observations that appeared to be based on representative, 
national coverage.  
 
source: Barro (1999) 
 
 
Around the world income inequality decreased in the 1960’s and 1970’s, while income 
inequality rose in the 1980’s. Of course, cross-country differences are substantial for every 
decade presented here.  
 
In this kind of empirical research there is a trade-off between data-quality and data-
availability. Despite the efforts made by Deininger and Squire, by Barro, and by others, most 
                                                          
2 See e.g. the UNU/WIDER - UNDP World Income Inequality Database (WIID, version 1.0, 12 September 2000); 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm. See also http://www.worldbank.org/html/prdmg/grthweb/dddeisqu.htm and 
http://worldpolicy.org/americas/econindex.html. 
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very large data-sets on world wide income inequality are not fit for cross-country analyses 
(Atkinson and Brandolini, 1999). Only subsets of these data-sets would qualify as high-
quality. However, selected countries and data-years still differ to a wide extent in concept 
(income versus consumption), the measure of income (gross versus net), the unit of 
observation (individuals versus households, or equivalence scale adjustments made), the 
coverage of the survey (national versus subnational). Those, and other, factors in different 
studies make it hard to compare levels or even trends of income inequality across countries. 3 
The most promising tool to analyse changes in the income distribution are high quality time-
series panel data. However, cross-national studies based on several years of panel data are 
just beginning to appear (see e.g. Headey, Goodin, Muffels and 
Dirven, 1997).4 The best cross-nationally comparable collection 
is the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). LIS was created 
specifically to improve consistency across countries. The LIS 
data are a collection of micro data-sets obtained from a range of 
income surveys in various countries. The advantage of these 
data is that extensive efforts have been made by country 
specialists to make information on income and household 
characteristics as comparable as possible across a large 
number of countries. The LIS data-sets can be used to compare 
the distribution of disposable income in 25 nations over a 20-
year period, though not all periods are available for all nations. 
 
 
2.2   Differences in Inequality across OECD Countries 
 
This section reviews the evidence on cross national comparisons of annual disposable 
income inequality over twenty wealthy nations. This section is mainly descriptive and relies 
on the empirical evidence from Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997 and 1998) and Smeeding 
(2000), and others using data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). We summarise 
empirical results by both analysing absolute levels and trends of income inequality across 
countries. However, many factors in different studies make it difficult to compare levels in 
inequality over time and across countries (differences in income concepts, income units, 
(summary) measures, equivalence adjustments and other factors). Observed trends in 
inequality will be comparable as long as differences across studies do not change over time.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Several studies try, however, to overcome the cross-country data-differences mentioned. See e.g. Dollar and Kraay (2000). 
The advanced econometric procedure used in their paper do not generate very precisely estimates for the adjustments needed 
(see the authors' note 8). In general, approaches to adjust the Deininger-Squire (1996) data-set, or augmented (updated) 
versions of the Deininger-Squire data-set, are very rude, i.e. very sensitive to the observations (not) included in the analyses. 
Atkinson and Brandolini (1999) therefore criticised both this types of adjustments and this type of large "secondary" data-
sets. 
4 At present there are a few countries for which panel data have been collected for ten years or more. Fully comparable 
data are available for only the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands and for only a few data years (1985-1989). 
Nevertheless, the approach by Headey, Goodin, Muffels and Dirven (1997) seems an attractive route in this kind of 
empirical research. 
'Measuring inequality is 
tricky business, requiring 
a creative combination 
of science, craft, and art. 
When done well, it 
produces both truth and 
beauty.' 
 
Philip B. Coulter in: 
 Measuring Inequality 
A Methodological Handbook 
 1989, p. 185 
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Levels of Income Inequality around the mid 1990's 
Levels of inequality can be shown in several ways, e.g. by Lorenz curves, specific points on 
the percentile distribution (P10 or P90), decile ratios (P90/P10), and Gini coefficients or many 
other summary statistics of inequality. All (summary) statistics of inequality can be used to 
rank income inequality in OECD countries, but they do not always tell the same story.  
 
Figure 1 shows two summary measures of the income distribution - the P90/P10-ratio and 
the Gini coefficient. Countries are listed in order of their P90/P10-ratio from smallest to 
largest. The obvious advantage of the presentation of inequality by summary statistics is its 
ability to summarise several nations in one picture.  
The highest inequality is found in the United States, while Nordic countries are the most 
equal nations. 
 
Figure 1  Summary Measures of the Income Distribution  (Adjusted Disposable Household Income) 
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source: Gottschalk and Smeeding (1998: figure 2) and updated figures from Smeeding (2000: figure 1) 
 
 
Other inequality indices would alter the country-ranking to some extent. However, roughly the 
same pattern of overall inequality is observed in other analyses of inequality (Atkinson, 
Rainwater, and Smeeding, 1995).  
We see that according to the Gini coefficient, the Netherlands is grouped with four other 
countries (Luxembourg, Germany, France, and Taiwan) with rather low coefficients 
compared to Switzerland, Canada, Spain, Israel, and Japan with somewhat higher 
coefficients; and five other countries with the highest coefficients, indicating the highest 
degree of inequality. 
Figure 1 indicates that a wide range of inequality exists across wealthy developed nations, 
with the nation with the highest inequality coefficient (United States) almost twice as high as 
the nation with the lowest coefficient (Sweden). 
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Lorenz Dominance 
Plots of Lorenz curves for several countries would allow us to see whether pairs of countries 
can be ranked by the standard Lorenz Dominance criteria.5 Empirical evidence clearly shows 
that incomes are more equally distributed in all Nordic countries than in the United States. 
Because the Lorenz curves of Nordic countries cross, the distributions within the region can 
not be ranked. The Benelux countries likewise show substantial uniformity across countries 
with each having greater equality than the United States. Among the Benelux countries, the 
Netherlands has the highest inequality but the differences in inequality among Benelux 
countries are small compared to the differences between these countries and the United 
States. Germany is more equal than Italy and France. Canada dominates Australia which 
dominates the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom and United States, however, cannot be 
ranked, since their Lorenz curves cross. 
 
Trends in Income Inequality since 1980 
LIS is very useful for measuring differences in inequality at a point in time, but is less well 
suited for measuring changes in inequality over time across countries (Smeeding, 2000). 
Ideally data collection on income inequality is both consistent over time and across countries. 
However, such a project is daunting at this time (Atkinson, Brandolini, Van der Laan, 
Smeeding, 2000:1). In assessing trends across countries one should be aware of noisy data 
due to definitional differences in income, definitional differences in population coverage 
(immigrants), differences in survey collections practices, and differences in periodicity related 
to the business cycle (Smeeding, 2000:214-219).  
An extensive survey by Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) covers many aspects of income 
inequality. The following stylised facts can be traced from their study: 
I Almost all countries experienced some increase in wage inequality during the 1980’s. Changes 
in household income inequality in most countries were smaller than changes in earnings 
inequality. In all OECD-countries post-tax and transfer disposable income is more equally 
distributed than market income. 
II Changes in taxes paid and transfers received - due to changes in tax and transfer structures in 
many countries - largely offset the changes in the distribution of markets income (pre-tax and 
pre-transfer). 
III However, the changes in the distribution of income are the result of a complicated set of forces. 
The links between changes in tax and transfer policy and the distribution of disposable income 
in different countries are not well understood at this stage. 
 
As far as disposable income is concerned, it is certainly wrong to think in terms of a world-wide 
trend towards increased income inequality in the 1980’s (cf. Atkinson, 1996:43). When we 
include the 1990’s, this conclusion alters somewhat. We rely on data from another paper by 
Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000) who list countries in order of yearly percentages changes in 
disposable income inequality - as measured by the change in the Gini coefficient - from largest 
to smallest change. Disposable income inequality increased dramatically in a number of 
                                                          
5 If the Lorenz curve that represents a distribution lies entirely inside another one, it can unequivocally be said that the 
country represented by the outside Lorenz curve is more unequal than the one represented by the one that lies inside. In 
case of Lorenz Dominance several summary measures of inequality (e.g. the Gini coefficient or Mean Log Deviation) 
will rank the distributions uniformly. However, if Lorenz curves do cross, than the way in which different inequality 
measures rank two different distributions depends on the importance each gives to different parts of the distribution (see 
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countries. Income inequality did not rise in only 3 of the 16 nations observed in the period 1979-
1995. See figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 Trends in Disposable Income Inequality 1979-1995 
Average Percentage Change per year of Gini Coefficient 
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note: Average percentage change per year equals the percentage change in the Gini coefficient over the period indicated divided 
by the number of years in the interval. 
 
source: Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000: figure 4 and appendix tables A2 and A3), and own calculations 
 
 
Note that the trends in figure 2 are based on an arbitrary period (1979-1995). Cyclical 
variations in inequality (if any) could be involved. Inequality increased by more than 1 percent a 
year in four countries over this period. The United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Australia are on top of the list in descending order. In the United States the largest increases in 
inequality occurred in the early 1980’s, with already a high level of inequality before the 
increase. Following Gottschalk and Smeeding (1998:27), the nations which showed a relatively 
early large rise in inequality (United States) appear to be experiencing a ceiling in those 
increases in the observed period. Thus, the increases we are seeing since are offsetting gains 
made during the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, the Swedish and Dutch distributions had low base 
Gini coefficients (1979) compared to the United Stated. This, however, is not the case for the 
United Kingdom.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Atkinson, 1970). Several measures may therefore value and rank one and the same income distribution differently (cf. 
Champernowne, 1974). 
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2.3   Conclusion on the Empirical Evidence 
 
While even the LIS-data are by no means perfect, they produce some consistent patterns. 
The range of income inequality among OECD countries seems very wide at any point in time. 
The Gini coefficient in the most unequal country (United States) is almost twice as large as 
found in the most equal country (Sweden). 
Income inequality has increased remarkably in a number of countries, particularly in the 
United Kingdom, but also in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Australia. While income inequality 
rose in 13 of the 16 nations examined from 1980 to 1995, this trend was not universal. In 
almost all countries inequality declined through the 1970s and started to increase in the 
1980s and/or 1990s.  
 
 
3   What Makes Income Inequality Vary over Time in Different Countries?  
 
3.1   Causes of change. Is it social policy? 
 
The increasing income inequality observed for most – but not all – Western economies over 
the last decades has coincided with many structural changes in the economic system. The 
world economy was hit by oil crises twice, there has been a tendency towards more free 
market oriented policies, and more women have entered the labor force. For many countries 
the main forces behind growing disposable income inequality are the growth of inequality of 
earned market income, demographic changes, changes in household size and composition, 
and other endogenous factors. Atkinson (2000:17) concludes that we should not expect the 
same development in all countries, because the distribution of income is subject to a wide 
variety of forces (which may differ over countries). The evolution of income inequality is not 
simply the product of common economic forces: it also represents the impact of institutions and 
national policies. We focus on social policy to that end, and look for a relationship, if any, 
between social policy and income inequality.  
Our hypothesis is that changes in social policies, such as expenditure cuts, reduction of benefit 
levels or more strict eligibility criteria, have made the national income distribution less equal. 
Obviously, such policies will only increase inequality when the (pre-reform) transfer system 
redistributes income from higher to lower income groups. This condition is usually met, at least 
in OECD-countries. On basis of the LIS-data presented by Ervik (1998) we find that the tax and 
transfer system does redistribute income in such a way that a substantial reduction in overall 
income inequality is accomplished in all of the eight OECD countries under consideration, 
though varying over time and over countries. However, there are also social benefits that 
mainly favour higher income groups, for example child benefits. When such benefits are cut, 
the income distribution will become more equal. But this is an exception to the rule. 
Also, changes in social policies, such as cuts in public benefits programs, can be offset by 
compensating (semi-) private programs or by negotiated changes in wages in which case the 
distribution of primary income changes. Thus, both on theoretical and empirical grounds the 
possible (causal) relationship between changes in social policies and the income distribution is 
not clear cut. 
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3.2   Empirical Evidence from a Straightforward Approach 
 
How do we measure changes in social policy or changes in "generosity" of social security 
systems? A range of indicators are used in comparative studies. We look at only two of these 
indicators in our straightforward approach (see also section 4): social security expenditures as 
percentage of GDP and the replacement rates.  
 
Social Security Transfers as percentage of GDP 
It is well known that social security systems and even social expenditures are very difficult to 
compare across countries. Countries often use different definitions of social security and of 
specific social risks, such as unemployment or disability. Moreover, benefits may be provided 
by either public institutions or market institutions. In the latter case, market provision may be 
regulated by government in such a way as to make it equivalent to public provision. These 
different forms of social protection are not included consistently in different national statistics. A 
specific statistical problem is related to the tax treatment of social benefits. In some countries 
benefits are taxable as a rule, in other countries not. Also, benefits can take the form of tax 
relief. These tax features can make a big difference in statistics on social expenditures (see 
Adema, 1999). Also, changes in expenditure ratios often do not reflect policy changes. Higher 
outlays can simply be the result of ageing or rising unemployment.  
To monitor social policy developments in the OECD area, we use the OECD Social 
Expenditure Database (SOCX) which facilitates trend analysis of aggregate net social 
expenditures and changes in its composition across OECD countries. It includes historical 
series for the 1980-1995/1996 period on public and mandatory private social expenditure at 
programme level. These net social expenditure indicators give us the best available picture 
of the extent and change of social protection across countries. 
However, expenditure ratios can only be considered as rough indicators of welfare state 
policies. Only under ceteris paribus conditions welfare retrenchments lower the social 
expenditure ratio. But it is also relevant when welfare reform, for example in a period of rising 
unemployment, is reflected in a less than average increase in the expenditure ratio, compared 
to other countries. 
 
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) use gross expenditure ratios to analyse the impact of social 
policy in the 1980’s. They conclude that there is a noticeable correlation between public cash 
transfer expenditures and disposable income inequality. While the level of social spending is 
negatively correlated with changes in income inequality, there is little relationship between 
retrenchment and increases in inequality in most countries. Reductions in social welfare 
spending for the non-aged and regressive changes in the structure of income taxes for some 
countries during the 1980's account for only a small part of the trend in post-tax and transfer 
inequality in most nations.  
We look at net expenditure ratios for a somewhat longer period. Table 2 shows that in all 
modern welfare states net social expenditures as a percentage of GDP rose in the period 
1980-1994.  
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Table 2   Net Social Expenditures as percentage of GDP, 1980-1994 
 
 around 1980 around 1994 change 
    
Australia 81-90 11.9    14.5 +2.6 
Canada 80-95 13.2   18.2 +5.1 
Finland 80-94 18.9   34.0 +15.1    
France 80-94 23.5    29.7 +6.2 
Germany 80-95 25.7    29.6 +3.9 
Ireland 80-94 17.6    20.0 +2.4 
Italy 80-95 18.4   23.7 +5.3 
Japan 80-93 10.0   12.6 +2.7 
Netherlands 80-94 28.5    29.0 +0.4 
Norway 80-95 18.8    28.5 +9.7 
Sweden 80-94 29.9    36.3 +6.5 
Switzerland 82-92 16.6    22.5 +5.9 
United Kingdom 80-95 18.3    22.8 +4.5 
United States 80-95 13.7    16.3 +2.5 
    
average (unweighted) 18.9    24.1 +5.2 
 
note: change equals the change in net social expenditures as percentage of GDP over the time frame indicated, i.e. from around 
1980 to around 1994. 
 
source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX, http://www.oecd.org/els/social); and own calculations 
 
 
The expansion of social security systems and/or safety nets in most countries mitigated the 
observed trend of increasing (market) income inequality to some extent during the period under 
consideration. Although for most countries both income inequality and social security transfers 
rose (this seems to contradict our hypothesis), the growth rates of social security transfers 
show variation across countries. Rising inequality in some countries could be associated with a 
below-average change in social security transfers as percentage of GDP.  
 
 
Replacement Rates 
Comparative studies of social security systems have increasingly turned to the use of 
replacement rates as measures of the level of benefits in different countries and therefore of 
the degree of social protection offered by different welfare systems. However, replacement 
rates can also only be viewed as limited indicators of the generosity of benefit systems 
(Whiteford, 1995). Some of the limitations are: i) replacement rates are based on entitlement 
rules and often represent only the maximum payment available in the circumstances specified; 
ii) benefits are often not fully indexed, implying that benefits represent a decreasing percentage 
of wages; iii) not all relevant benefits may be reckoned with (such as housing subsidies or 
health care); iv) taxation can blur the picture. Bearing these limitations in mind, we can look at 
table 3, which presents the development of replacement rates for unemployment benefits for 
15 OECD countries. All replacement rate calculations are based on the level of previous 
earnings defined with reference to the Average Production Worker (APW), taking as the two 
most significant cases the APW level of earnings and two thirds of the APW level of earnings.  
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Table 3  Gross Replacement Rates Unemployment Benefits OECD, 1979-1994 
 
 around 1979 around 1994 change 
    
Australia 81-95 22.1 27.0 +4.9 
Canada 79-95 25.6 27.2 +1.6 
Finland 79-95 26.5 43.2 +16.7    
France 79-95 24.0 37.4 +13.4 
Germany 79-95 25.1 27.2 +2.1 
Ireland 79-93 28.1 30.8 +2.7 
Italy 79-95 1.0 19.3 +18.3 
Japan 79-93 8.7 9.9 +1.2 
Netherlands 79-95 47.5 45.8   -1.7 
Norway 79-91 19.9 38.9 +19.0 
Sweden 79-95 25.1 27.2 +2.1 
Switzerland 81-93 12.8 29.5 +16.7 
United Kingdom 79-95 23.8 17.8 -6.0 
United States 79-93 11.7 11.9 +0.2 
    
average (unweighted) 21.6 28.8 +6.5 
 
note: Replacement rates (i.e. benefits before tax as a percentage of previous earnings before tax) as defined by legislated 
entitlements averaged across various circumstances in which an unemployed person may be. Change equals the 
change in replacement rates over the time frame indicated. 
 
Explanation: Benefit entitlements have been estimated for two earnings levels (average earnings and two-thirds of average 
earnings), three family situations (single, with dependent spouse, with spouse in work) and three durations of 
unemployment spells (one year, 2 to 3 years, 4 to 5 years out of work). For every data-year the unweighted 
averages of these replacement rates are computed. The computations assume standard circumstances such as 
40 years of age, involuntary loss of the job, long previous work record, etc.  
 
source: OECD (data provided by Glenn Cooper) 
 
 
In only two countries - The United Kingdom and the Netherlands - replacement rates of 
unemployment benefits declined in the period 1979-1994. The other countries show 
increases in the replacement rate, varying from 1.2 percentage points in Japan to 19.0 
percentage points in Norway. 
 
Relationship 
Is there a relationship between these changes? Table 4 combines the changes in the Gini’s 
with the changes in the expenditure ratio’s and the replacement rates. The countries are 
ranked by the changes in the Gini, from high to low. It appears that the countries with an 
above average rise in inequality show less than average increases in the expenditure ratio 
(with the exception of Sweden) and less than average increases (or decreases) in the 
replacement rate. Especially the UK and the Netherlands are interesting cases: these 
countries combine a relatively large increase in inequality with lower replacement rates and 
for the Netherlands also a slightly lower expenditure ratio. These are indications that support 
our hypothesis. For the group of countries with less than average increases (or even 
declines) in inequality, however, the picture is less clear. For these countries we would 
expect higher than average increases in the expenditure ratio and the replacement rate. 
Especially for the expenditure ratio such a relation can not be found.6 This is confirmed by a 
                                                          
6 Especially Sweden combines an above-average growth rate in social security transfers with a relatively large rise in income 
inequality. Note that a weak positive relationship between social security transfers and inequality can also be the result of the 
fact that social security transfers are not well-targeted towards the poor. Another explanation is put forward by Eriksson and 
Pettersson (2000). In their analysis they eliminate various peculiarities in the Swedish data that often are disregarded in 
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simple regression analysis reported in table 5. The estimated coefficient of the expenditure 
ratio-variable is not significant.7 However, using the replacement rate as dependent variable 
produces the expected negative sign, while the coefficient is statistically significant.  
Obviously, this straightforward analysis is much to simple to draw far-reaching conclusions. 
The material presented is only descriptive and does not explain changes in the household 
income distribution. Such an analysis should be based on a theory, which would have to 
address at least the following cross-national differences (cf. Gottschalk and Smeeding, 
2000:263): differences in labor markets that affect earnings of individual household members; 
difference sources of capital and in returns to capital; demographic differences, such as the 
ageing of the population and growth of single parent households, which affect both family 
needs and labor market decisions; and differences across countries in tax and transfers 
policies that not only affect family income directly, but also this may affect work and investment 
decisions. Such a comprehensive approach is far beyond the scope of this paper. 
Our material nevertheless does support a relationship between changes in income inequality 
and changes in social policies, as indicated by the generosity of unemployment benefits. 
Especially the UK and the Netherlands show patterns that are consistent with our hypothesis. 
A much more elaborate country-approach is needed, however, to be more conclusive, which 
we attempt for the case of the Netherlands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
international comparisons. According to Eriksson and Pettersson the upward trend in inequality - as measured with LIS-data 
- is due to changes in capital gains taxes (tax reform, page 162).   
7 A similar regression is done by Gouyette and Pestieau (1999) with the level of the Gini and the level of social spending. They 
find a pretty good fit.  
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Table 4 Cross Country Changes 1979-1994 in Net Social Expenditures, Gross 
Replacement Rates and Gini's 
 
 income 
inequality 
 
change Gini 
(percentage) 
net social expenditures 
as % of GDP 
 
change 
(percentage points) 
gross replacement 
rates 
 
change 
(percentage points) 
    
average 9.8 5.2 6.5 
    
above-average    
United Kingdom 31,0 4.5 -6.0 
Sweden 28.4 6.5 2.1 
Netherlands 17.3 0.4 -1.7 
Australia 12.2 2.6 4.9 
Japan 13.4 2.7 1.2 
    
below-average    
United States 9.5 2.5 0.2 
Switzerland 9.5 5.9 16.7 
France 8.2 6.2 13.4 
Germany 7.8 3.9 2.1 
Norway 7.1 9.7 19.0 
Canada 0.5 5.1 1.6 
Finland -1.4    15.1 16.7 
Ireland -1.8    2.4 2.7 
Italy -4.2    5.3 18.3 
 
note: countries are ranked in order of the percentage change in Gini coefficient of equivalent disposable household income 
 
source Gini coefficient: see below figure 2; source net social expenditure ratios: see below table 2; source gross 
replacement rates: see below table 3; and own calculations 
 
 
Table 5 Impact of the Change in Net Social Expenditures and Gross Replacement 
Rates on the Change in Inequality 1979-1994 
 
Dependent variable Intercept Net Social 
Expenditures 
Gross Replacement 
Rates 
R2 
    
6.126 -0.093  0.0705 
(4.463) (-0.954)   
    
11.039  -0.461 0.3286 
 
 
 
 
Gini Coefficient 
 
(4.122)  (-2.424)  
  
note: OLS-regression; t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
4   Budget Incidence Analysis for the Netherlands 
 
4.1   Social Policies in the Netherlands  
 
The Dutch social protection system used to be characterised by generous open-ended 
benefits and lax administrative control. However, the expansion of the system caused severe 
and growing problems, starting in the 1970’s. The number of benefit recipients and the 
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financial burden of inactivity rose dramatically, as can be seen in table 6. Combined with a 
number of adverse macroeconomic shocks, a vicious cycle of increasing (non-wage) labor 
costs, erosion of employment and growing benefit dependency was set in motion. Reform of 
the social system was called for and was indeed initiated in the early 1980’s. Actually, the 
change in policy stance occurred at a relatively early stage, compared to other European 
countries, because of the severity of the problems (Bovenberg, 2000). 
 
Table 6  Key figures on Social Security in the Netherlands 
 
 1970 1980 1990 1999 
     
Public expenditure on social security as % GDP a 17.2    26.4    25.8    20.7    
Number of benefit recipients in millions 2.0 3.1 4.0 4.1 
Same under age 65  0.7 1.4 2.0 1.9 
Benefit recipients as % of employment 45 66 82 69 
Real disposable income of welfare and old age 
benefits (index: 1973 = 100) 
  
124 
 
114 
 
112 
 
a Excluding supplementary labor pensions and housing subsidies, including public expenditure on health care 
 
source: Ministry of Social Affairs (1995:5) and (1999) 
 
 
In the 1980’s reform strategy was almost exclusively directed at cutting benefit levels. The 
(legally required) indexation of social benefits to wage development was suspended during 
almost the entire 1980’s and partly in the first half of the 1990’s. Actually, in many years no 
adjustment for inflation took place, that is benefits were frozen in nominal terms. Also, 
unemployment and disability benefits were cut from 80 percent to 70 percent of previous 
wages. As a consequence of these and other measures, real disposable income of many 
beneficiaries strongly fell since 1980.8 The strategy was successful in containing expenditure 
growth. Public expenditure on social protection roughly stabilised in the 1980's, despite 
continuing growth of benefit volumes.  
In the 1990’s the reform strategy has been primarily directed at reducing the number of 
beneficiaries, through encouraging labor force participation, and discouraging and preventing 
benefit dependency. Important policy measures in this context have been the tightening of 
eligibility requirements in the unemployment and disability schemes, reform of the benefit 
administration, and the introduction of stronger financial incentives for employees and – 
especially – employers. The sickness benefit scheme has been privatised in the period 1994-
1996, which means that employers are now fully responsible for paying sickness benefits of 
70 percent of wages during the first year of sick leave. This risk can be privately insured, 
which has actually occurred on a large scale. The disability scheme has also been changed 
fundamentally, through the introduction of experience rating. Also, the option was introduced 
for employers to private coverage of the disability risk during the first five years of disability. 
Radical changes have been made in the survivors scheme. Most people are now expected to 
privately insure against the risk of disease of relatives. 
The reduction in statutory benefits has been offset to a large extent, because trade unions 
have negotiated supplementary benefits, especially sickness benefits and disability benefits. 
                                                          
8  On the other hand, the increases of real disposable income of social security beneficiaries had been large in the 1970’s.  
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However, employees (and others) not taking part in these collective contracts do not profit 
from this. 
The figures in table 6 show that these policies had some success in terms of a halting the 
rise in claimants under 65 years, but so far the rising trend has not been clearly reversed. A 
more positive development is that the ratio of benefit recipients to the number of employed is 
falling in recent years, as a consequence of rapid employment growth. Also, total expenditure 
on social security is declining in recent years. It is interesting to see how these reforms 
affected the income distribution. 
 
 
4.2   Methodology 
 
Social security schemes in the Netherlands, as in many countries, make low income earners 
better of after social policy than before. In general, income is transferred from high income 
earners to poor ones through taxes and transfers. We analyse the effect of social policy on 
the distribution of income as follows. The distribution of primary or wage and salary income is 
compared with the distribution of income after tax and after social transfers, see scheme 1. 
Summary statistics of income inequality before and after social policy are used to indicate the 
amount of distribution by social policy (in line with Ervik, 1998 and Duclos, 2000). 
Analyses of statutory and budget incidence can be found for decades in literature on public 
finance.9 Of course, also critical literature on budget incidence analyses has emerged – but 
these criticisms leave the stylised conclusions intact; see a critical survey of efforts to measure 
budget incidence by Smolensky, Hoyt and Danziger (1987). For example, the important issue of 
tax/transfer shifting is totally ignored in analyses on budget incidence in such a classical 
framework. However, models that include all behavioral links are beyond the scope of existing 
empirical work (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1998:3). Therefore, researchers have restricted 
themselves largely to accounting exercises which decompose changes in overall inequality 
into a set of components.  
To identify changes in the redistributive 
effect of taxes and social transfers over 
time, we use data for a long time period. 
For reasons of data-availability we have to 
analyse the whole trajectory from original 
or market income to net disposable income 
(trajectory a-c in scheme 1) to approach 
the impact of the tax and benefit system as 
part of the overall trend in income 
distribution. We calculate the statutory or 
budget incidence of social policy in line with 
the work of Musgrave, Case and Leonard 
(1974). That is, important issues of 
tax/transfer shifting and behavioral 
responses are ignored.  
                                                          
9 See for example Dalton (1936), Musgrave and Tun Thin (1948), Gillespie (1965), Kakwani (1977a), Reynolds and 
Smolenskey (1977), Kiefer (1984) and Silber (1994), and more recent analyses based on the Luxembourg Income Study 
database (some of them are also listed in our references). 
scheme 1 
 
 
primary income  (a) 
 
+/+ social welfare benefits 
+/+ social insurance transfers 
-/- social security contributions 
-/- direct taxes (i.e. that part of direct taxes to finance 
social welfare) 
 
 = income after taxes / contributions, after transfers  (b) 
 
+/+ other sources of income 
-/- other taxes/contributions 
 
= disposable net income  (c) 
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Our measure of the redistributive impact of social security on inequality is straightforwardly 
based on formulas developed by Kakwani (1986) and Ringen (1991): 
 
Redistribution by government = (primary income – disposable income) / (primary income) 
 
This formula is used to estimate the reduction in inequality produced by social security, where 
primary income inequality is given by a summary statistic of pre-tax, pre-transfer incomes and 
disposable income inequality is given by the same summary statistic of disposable equivalent 
incomes. The measures of both pre- and post-social security income are far from ideal. At a 
conceptual level, no conceivable measure of pre-social security income could indicate what the 
income distribution would look like if social security did not exist. 
 
The unit of analysis is an important issue in income distribution studies. We follow most of the 
literature in applying adjusted household income in our analysis. The next question is which 
equivalence scale should be used to adjust for household size and composition?10 We assume 
an equivalence scale elasticity of 0.5, which is consistent with recent estimates (Schiepers, 
1998:120). 
 
 
4.3   Results 
 
We first show the long-run trend in disposable household income inequality in the Netherlands. 
Several summary statistics of disposable household income inequality are shown in table 7. 
All summary statistics indicate a significant increase in inequality of adjusted disposable 
income between 1977 and 1997, although the magnitude of the increase varies. The spread 
is between +12 percent for the Gini coefficient and +30 percent as measured by Log 
Deviation.11  
Our findings do not seem to be very sensitive for the beginning and end points of the analysis. 
The cyclical economic conditions in 1977 and 1997 did not differ very much. We calculated a 
GDP-trend over the period 1976-2000, and find that the economic growth of 1977 was +0.9 
point above this trend line; real GDP-growth in 1997 lies 0.5 point above the trend line.  
 
Table 7  Trend in Adjusted Disposable Household Income Inequality 1977-1997 
 
 1977 1997 change %-change 
     
Gini Coefficient 0.243 0.273 +0.030 +12 
     
Mean Log Deviation (Theil Index) 0.110 0.141 +0.031 +28 
     
Log Deviation 0.070 0.091 +0.021 +30 
 
source:  Gini Coefficient and Mean Log Deviation are from Trimp (1999) and Statistics Netherlands (1999:119); 
Log Deviation is taken from Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau (1998:108) and refer to 1977 and 1995; and 
own calculations 
                                                          
10 It has been shown that, within a wide range, the choice of equivalence scales affects international comparisons of income 
inequality to a wide extend. Alternatively adjustment methods would definitely affect the ranking of countries, although 
the broad pattern remains the same (Atkinson, Rainwater, Smeeding, 1995:52).  
11 It should be noted that Log Deviation is especially sensitive to changes at the top of the income distribution. 
18 
Figure 3 shows the Lorenz curves of disposable household income for 1977 and 1997. The 
Lorenz curve for 1977 remains above the Lorenz curve for 1997 (i.e. both curves do not 
intersect). Therefore it is possible to draw conclusions about the degree of inequality (Lorenz 
Dominance Theorem).12 The distribution for 1977 is unambiguously more equal than the 
distribution of disposable income for 1997.  
 
 
Figure 3  Lorenz Curves of Adjusted Disposable Household Income, 1977 and 1997 
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source: Statistics Netherlands (1999:118), and own calculations 
 
 
Income inequality did go up substantially in the Netherlands in the period 1977-1997, 
although the direction of change was not one-way up. We perform a budget incidence 
analysis for the period 1981-1997, because we measure the lowest level of inequality in the 
early 1980’s (as most studies for the Netherlands do). Inequality especially rose during the 
1980’s. We analyse the trajectory from primary or market income to disposable income (cf. 
scheme 1).  
Mean Log Deviation (Theil index) is used as a summary measure of income inequality, 
because it is generally agreed upon that this statistic is best suited to identify components of 
the change in inequality, that is for assessing the impact of taxes and benefits on inequality.  
The Mean Log Deviation can be meaningfully added and subtracted [from another] in a way 
that most other indices cannot.13 
 
Table 8 illustrates the decomposition of the trend in inequality in the Netherlands. As 
expected, adjusted disposable incomes are distributed much more equally than primary 
                                                          
12. See footnote 5. 
13 It should be noted that the choice for a specific summary measure of inequality is especially important when Lorenz 
curves intersect. However, in our budget incidence analysis the Lorenz Dominance Theorem can be applied. For all data-
years the Lorenz curve for disposable income (or after-tax-after-transfer income) lies inside the Lorenz curve for primary 
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incomes. In the years shown, inequality was reduced by some 80 percent. By far the largest 
part of the overall reduction in inequality (about 60 percentage points) is due to social 
transfers. Note, however, that the redistributive effect of transfers has become smaller in the 
period under consideration. Taxes and social security contributions reduce inequality by 
some 7 to 10 percentage points. Finally, the use of equivalence scales reduces inequality by 
another 10 percentage points. 
 
Table 8  Decomposition of Inequality in Household Income: Mean Log Deviation 
 
 level change share in change 
 
 
 
1981 
 
1991 
 
1997 
 
1981-1997 
 
1981-1997 
      
Primary income 0.532 0.540 0.545 +0.013 36% 
  effect transfers -0.334 -0.324 -0.320 +0.014 39% 
      
Gross income 0.198 0.216 0.225   
  effect taxes -0.054 -0.040 -0.045 +0.009 25% 
      
Disposable income 0.144 0.176 0.180 +0.036 100% 
  adjustment for household size 
  and composition 
 
-0.048 
 
-0.057 
 
-0.056 
 
-0.008 
 
      
Disposable income equivalence scale 0.096 0.119 0.124 +0.028  
 
source: 
Data on the partial effects of transfers and taxes for 1981 are from Odink (1985); for 1991 from Jeurissen (1995) and 
for 1997 are own calculations. The partial effects of household size and composition are taken from Trimp (1993) and 
De Kleijn (1998). The data mentioned did not (always) correspond. For all data-years we have postulated the same 
income concepts and used the same income units as Jeurissen (i.e. definitions from before a major tax reform in 
1990) to arrive identical decomposition of income inequality for all data-years. Thereafter we reweighted the partial 
effects (of taxes, transfers and household size and decomposition). Because of these transformations values in the 
table will differ from values as presented by Statistics Netherlands (and other studies) as reported in table 7. 
 
 
Which are the main factors behind the changes in the income distribution? These are shown in 
the right part of table 8. In the period considered, the Mean Log Deviation for  disposable 
income increased by 36 points, which is equivalent to a rise in overall inequality by 25 percent 
(29 percent when adjusted income is taken).  
 
A major force behind the rise in overall inequality of disposable household income is a more 
unequal distribution of primary income (13 points or 36% of the total change). This is partly 
caused by the strong rise in the labor force participation of secondary earners (women). 
Another factor behind the increase in inequality is lower progressivity of the tax system (9 
points or 25%).14 But social transfers explain the largest part of the total increase in inequality 
(39%).15  
We conclude that the change in social policies since the early 1980’s has indeed made the 
income distribution less equal. Social transfers are a main force behind the rise in overall 
income inequality. It should be noted, however, that our results are only rough estimates, given 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
income. See e.g. Atkinson (1970), Kiefer (1984), Formby, Smith and Thistle (1990), Lambert (1993) and Silber (1994) for a 
technical advanced debate on the measurement of income inequality by summary statistics. 
14 This is consistent with other research we did, see Caminada and Goudswaard (1996). 
15 The growth in the number of one-person households since 1981 has made the non-adjusted distribution of disposable 
household income more unequal (cf. Trimp, 1999 and Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 1998:109). 
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the limitations of the budget incidence method. Including the effect of behavioral responses 
would probably provide a different result. Transfers cuts have reduced replacement ratios 
which has stimulated labor force participation of benefit recipients.16 This may have reduced 
income inequality. Tax shifting, however, probably did not affect our results. Empirical research 
indicates that tax shifting has not changed to a significant degree in the Netherlands during the 
period concerned (Muysken, Van Veen and De Regt, 1999). 
 
 
5   Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we investigated whether changes in the overall distribution of incomes in OECD 
countries can be attributed to social policy measures. Income inequality rose in 13 out of 16 
OECD countries since the early 1980’s. In some countries this rise was rather dramatic, 
especially in the United Kingdom and in Sweden and - to a lesser extent - in the Netherlands. 
We do not find a clear relationship between changes in inequality and changes in welfare state 
policies as measured by social expenditure ratios. Changes in replacement rates, however, 
seem to be a relevant factor. Especially the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are 
interesting cases: these countries combined an above-average rise in inequality with a 
reduction in the generosity of the welfare system. 
We performed a more elaborated country approach for the case of the Netherlands, which is 
interesting because this country combined a relative sharp increase in income inequality with a 
quite fundamental reform of the welfare state. Despite some methodological problems 
traditional budget incidence approach is used to study the combined impact of all taxes and 
transfers on the income (re)distribution. The distribution of primary or wage and salary income 
is compared with the distribution of income after tax and after social transfers. Summary 
statistics of income before and after social policy are used to indicate the redistributive effect of 
social policy. We find that inequality of disposable household income increased in the period 
1981-1997 by roughly 25 percent as measured by the Mean Log Deviation. The Lorenz 
Dominance Theorem indicates that the 1997-distribution of disposable income was 
unambiguously less equal than the 1981-distribution. Almost 40 percent of the increase in 
inequality can be attributed to transfers. Another important force was a more unequal 
distribution of market income. Increasing labor force participation among secondary earners 
has substantially contributed to increased inequality, which is probably typical of recent trends 
in some other European countries. 
Our budget incidence analysis thus indicates that social security reforms have had an 
important impact on increasing inequality in the Netherlands. These reforms were motivated 
by, or even made inevitable by strong budgetary pressures and worsening economic 
conditions in the early 1980's. It should be noted, however, that after the social security 
reforms, the generosity of the Dutch income transfer system is still quite high in an international 
perspective. Also, the overall level of Netherlands income inequality is still below the OECD 
average.  
                                                          
16 See e.g. Gelauff and Graafland (1994, chapter on 10 'Cutting back the welfare state'). 
21 
References 
 
Adema, W. (1999) 'Net Social Expenditures', Labour Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers no. 39; OECD 
working papers vol. 7, no. 61, OECD, Paris. 
Atkinson, A.B. (1970) 'On the Measurement of Inequality' Journal of Economic Theory 2:244-263. 
Atkinson, A.B., L. Rainwater, and T.M. Smeeding (1995) 'Income Distribution in OECD Countries: Evidence from the 
Luxembourg Income Study' OECD Social Policy Studies 18, Paris. 
Atkinson, A.B. (1996) 'Explaining the Distribution of Income' in: J. Hills (eds.) New inequalities, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge:19-48. 
Atkinson, A.B., and A. Brandolini (1999) 'Promise and Pitfalls in the Use of "Secondary" Data-Sets: Income 
Inequality in OECD Countries', Manuscript. Nuffield College, Oxford and Banca d'Italia, Research Department. 
Atkinson, A.B. (2000) 'The Changing Distribution of Income: Evidence and Explanation', German Economic Review 
1 (1):3-18. 
Atkinson, A.B., A. Brandolini, P. van der Laan, and T. Smeeding (2000) 'Producing Time Series Data for Income 
Distribution: Sources, Methods, and Techniques', Paper prepared for the 26th General Conference of The 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, Cracow, Poland: August 27-September 2, 2000. 
Barro, R.J. (1999) 'Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries', NBER Working Paper no. 7038, Cambridge. 
Bovenberg, A.L. (2000) 'Reforming Social Insurance in The Netherlands' International Tax and Public Finance 7 
(3):345-371. 
Caminada, K., and K.P. Goudswaard (1996) 'Progression and Revenue Effects of Income Tax Reform' International 
Tax and Public Finance 3 (1):57-66. 
Champernowne, D.G. (1974) 'A Comparison of Measures of Inequality of Income Distribution' Economic Journal 
84:787-816. 
Coulter, P.B. (1989) Measuring Inequality: A Methodological Handbook, Westview Press, London. 
Dalton, H. (1936) Pinciples of Public Finance, third edition, George Routledge & Sons, London. 
Deininger, K., and L. Squire (1996) 'A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality', The World Bank Economic 
Review 10 (3):565-592.  
Dollar, D., and A. Kraay (2000) 'Growth Is Good for the Poor', World Bank, Development Research Group, 
(forthcoming Working Paper). 
Duclos, J.-Y. (2000) 'Gini Indices and Redistribution of Income', International Tax and Public Finance 7 (2):141-162.  
Eriksson, I., and T. Pettersson (2000) 'Income Distribution and Income Mobility - Recent Trends in Sweden', in: R. 
Hauser and I. Becker (eds.) The Personal Distribution of Income in an International Perspective, Berlin, Germany, 
Springer-Verlag:158-175. 
Ervik, R. (1998) 'The Redistributive Aim of Social Policy. A Comparative Analysis of Taxes, Tax Expenditure 
Transfers and Direct Transfers in Eight Countries' LIS Working Paper Series 184, Luxembourg. 
Figini, P. (1998) 'Inequality Measures, Equivalence Scales and Adjustment for Household Size and Composition' LIS 
Working Paper Series 185, Luxembourg. 
Formby, J.P., W.J. Smith, and P.D. Thistle (1990) 'The Average Tax Burden and the Welfare Implications of Global 
Tax Progressivity' Public Finance Quarterly 18 (1):3-24. 
Föster, M. (2000) 'Trend and Driving Factors in Income Distribution and Poverty in the OECDF Area', Labour Market 
and Social Policy Occasional Papers no. 42, OECD, Paris. 
Gelauff, G.M.M., and J.J. Graafland (1994) 'Modelling Welfare State Reform', Amsterdam, Elsevier Science. 
Gillespie, W.I. (1965) 'Effects of Public Expenditures on the Distribution of Income' in: R. Musgrave (eds.) Essays in 
Fiscal Feralism, The Brookings Institution, Washington. 
Gottschalk,P., B. Gustafsson, and E. Palmer (eds.) (1997) Changing Patterns in the Distribution of Economic 
Welfare, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Gottschalk, P., and T.M. Smeeding (1997) 'Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income Inequality' Journal 
of Economic Literature 35 (June):633-687. 
Gottschalk, P., and T.M. Smeeding (1998) 'Empirical Evidence on Income Inequality in Industrialized Countries LIS 
Working Paper Series 154 (revised), Luxembourg. 
Gottschalk, P., and T. Smeeding (2000) 'Empirical Evidence on Income Inequality in Industrialized Countries', in: 
A.B. Atkinsin and F. Bourgignon (eds.) Handbook of Income Distribution, New York, Elsevier-North Holland 
Publishers, Vol. 1:262-307. 
Gouyette, C., and P. Pestieau (1999) 'Efficiency of the Welfare State' Kyklos 52 (4):537-553. 
Gustafsson, B., and M. Johansson (1997) ' In Search for a Smoking Gun: What Makes Income Inequality Vary Over 
Time in Different Countries?' LIS Working Paper Series 172, Luxembourg. 
Headey, B., R.E. Goodin, R. Muffels, and H-J. Dirven (1997) ‘Welfare Over Time: Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism in Panel Perspective” Journal of Public Policy 17 (3):329-359. 
Jeurissen, P.C.J. (1995) 'Robin Hood in Nederland’ (Robin Hood in the Netherlands) Sociaal-economische 
maandstatistiek 12 (4):17-21. 
22 
Kakwani, N.C. (1977a) 'Measurement of Tax Progressivity: An International Comparison' Economic Journal 
87:71-80. 
Kakwani, N.C. (1977b) 'Applications of Lorenz Curves in Economic Analysis' Econometrica 45 (3):719-727. 
Kakwani, N.C. (1986) Analyzing Redistribution Policies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Kiefer, D.W. (1984) 'Distributional Tax Progressivity Indexes' National Tax Journal 37:497-513. 
Kleijn, J.P. De (1998) 'Inkomensverdeling 1996' (Income Distribution 1996) Sociaal-economische maandstatistiek 
15 (3):18-22 and 75-85. 
Lambert, P.J. (1993) The Distribution and Redistribution of Income: a Mathematical Analysis, second edition, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester. 
Ministry of Social Affairs (1995) Sociale Nota 1996, (in Dutch), Sdu Uitgevers, The Hague. 
Ministry of Social Affairs (1999) Sociale Nota 2000, (in Dutch), Sdu Uitgevers, The Hague. 
Musgrave, R.A., and Tun Thin (1948) 'Income Tax Progression, 1929-48' Journal of Political Economy 56:498-514. 
Musgrave, R.A., K.E. Case, and H.B. Leonard (1974) 'The Distribution of Fiscal Burdens and Benefits' Public 
Finance Quarterly (2), July:259-311. 
Muysken, J., T. van Veen, and E. de Regt (1999) 'Does a Shift in the Tax Burden Create Unemployment?' Applied 
Economics 31:1195-1205. 
Odink, J.G. (1985) Inkomensherverdeling - enkele aspecten van de inkomensherverdeling door de overheid in 
Nederland, (PhD in Dutch about Income Redistribution), Wolters-Noordhoff, Groningen. 
OECD (1994) The OECD Jobs Study: Facts Analysis Strategies, Paris, OECD. 
OECD (1994) The OECD Jobs Study: Evidence and Explanations (part 1 and 2), Paris, OECD. 
Reynolds, M., and E. Smolensky (1977) 'Post Fisc Distributions of Income 1950, 1961, and 1970' Public Finance 
Quarterly 5:419-438. 
Ringen, S. (1991) 'Households, standard of living and inequality', Review of Income and Wealth 37:1-13.  
Schiepers, J.M.P. (1998) 'Equivalentiefactoren: methode en belangrijkste uitkomsten', (Equivalence Scales for the 
Netherlands: Methodology and Main Results), in: CBS Jaarboek Welvaartsverdeling 1998, Kluwer/CBS, 
Deventer:117-121. 
Silber, J. (1994) 'Income Distribution, Tax Structure, and the Measurement of Tax Progressivity' Public Finance 
Quarterly 22 (1):86-102. 
Smeeding, T. (2000) 'Changing Income Inequality in OECD Countries: Updated Results from the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS)', in: R. Hauser and I. Becker (eds.) The Personal Distribution of Income in an International 
Perspective, Berlin, Germany, Springer-Verlag:205-224. 
Smolensky, E., W. Hoyt, and S. Danziger (1987) 'A Critical Survey of Efforts to Measure Budget Incidence' in: H.M. 
van de Kar, B.L. Wolfe (eds.), The Relevance of Public Finance for Policy-Making, Proceedings IIFP Congress 
1985, Detroit:165-179. 
Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (1998) Sociaal en Cultureel Rapport 1998. 25 jaar sociale verandering (Social 
Cultural Report 1998), SCP, Rijswijk. 
Statistics Netherlands, CBS (1999) 'Inkomensverdeling 1977-1997. Tabellen’ (Income Distribution 1977-1999. 
Tables) Sociaal-economische maandstatistiek 16 (5):107-119. 
Trimp, L. (1993) 'Inkomens van huishoudens, 1977-1990' (Income of Households, 1977-1990) Sociaal-
economische maandstatistiek 10 (7):16-18. 
Trimp, L. (1999) 'Inkomensverdeling 1977-1997' (Income Distribution 1977-1997) Sociaal-economische 
maandstatistiek 16 (5):21-27. 
Whiteford, P. (1995) 'The use of replacement rates in international comparisons of benefit systems' International 
Social Security Review 48 (2):3-30.  
 
 
 
23 
Annex  Comparative database: availability data around 1979 and 1994 
 
  database 1 database 2 database 3 database 4 database 5 database 6  
         
COUNTRIES income inequality 
around 1995 
trend income inequality 
around 1979-1995 
gross replacement 
rates 
comparative welfare 
state data set 
gross social transfers 
 as % of GNP 
net social expenditures 
as % of GDP 
qualified 
   
LIS 
 
LIS 
 
OECD 
 
LIS / OECD 
OECD 
Economic Outlook 
OECD  
SOCX Data base 
 
         
1 Austria n.a. n.a. x x x x no 
2 Australia x x x x x x yes 
3 Belgium x n.a. x x x x no 
4 Canada x x x x x x yes 
5 Denmark x dropped x x x x no 
6 Finland x x x x x x yes 
7 France x x x x x x yes 
8 Germany x x x x x x yes 
9 Greece n.a. n.a. x n.a. x x no 
10 Israel x x n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. no 
11 Ireland x x x x x x yes 
12 Italy x x x x x x yes 
13 Japan x x x x x x yes 
14 Luxembourg x n.a. n.a. x n.a. x no 
15 Netherlands x x x x x x yes 
16 New Zealand x n.a. x x n.a. x no 
17 Norway x x x x x x yes 
18 Portugal n.a. n.a. x n.a. x x no 
19 Spain x n.a. x n.a. x x no 
20 Sweden x x x x x x yes 
21 Switzerland x x x x x x yes 
22 Taiwan x x n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. no 
23 United Kingdom x x x x x x yes 
24 United States x x x x x x yes 
         
 coverage 21 16 21 19 20 21 14 
         
 
sources: 
database 1: Gottschalk and Smeeding (1998: figure 2) and updated figures from Smeeding (2000: figure 1) 
database 2: Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000: figure 4 and appendix tables A2 and A3), and own calculations 
database 3: OECD (data provided by Glenn Cooper, may 2000) 
database 4: Comparative Welfare State Data Set LIS / OECD (http://lissy.ceps.lu/compwsp.htm)  
database 5: Data Set OECD Economic Outlook (December 1998) 
database 6: OECD, SOCX Database (downloading 11-1-2001); http://www.oecd.org/els/social 
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Trends in Disposable Income Inequality Gini Coefficient  Index Gini (1979=100) 
 
 year 1: year 2: number of years index annual % change 
      
Australia 1981 1990 9 1.0730 0.81 
Canada 1979 1995 16 1.0056 0.04 
Finland 1979 1994 15 0.9858 -0.09 
France 1979 1994 15 1.0820 0.55 
Germany 1979 1995 16 1.0827 0.52 
Ireland 1980 1994 14 0.9830 -0.12 
Italy 1979 1995 16 0.9556 -0.28 
Japan 1979 1993 14 1.1250 0.89 
Netherlands 1979 1994 15 1.1731 1.15 
Norway 1979 1995 16 1.0760 0.48 
Sweden 1979 1994 15 1.2837 1.89 
Switzerland 1982 1992 10 1.0632 0.63 
United Kingdom 1979 1995 16 1.3306 2.07 
United States 1979 1996 17 1.1071 0.63 
average qualifiers 1979.4 1994.0 14.6 1.0947 0.65 
      
source: Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000: figure 4 and appendix tables A2 and A3), and own calculations 
 
 
Social Security Transfers as percentage of GDP, 1979-1994 
 
 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
                 
Australia 19.3 19.0 19.5 19.9 20.0 20.0 20.4 20.6 21.1 20.3 19.9 19.8 20.0 20.3 21.8 21.8 
Canada 9.6 9.9 9.9 11.7 12.4 12.1 12.2 12.4 12.3 12.8 11.8 12.9 14.7 15.7 16.0 15.2 
Denmark 15.4 16.6 17.8 18.1 17.8 17.0 16.3 15.5 16.3 17.6 18.1 18.4 19.0 19.6 20.4 22.0 
Finland 9.4 9.1 9.1 10.1 13.9 14.0 14.8 15.3 15.4 14.7 14.4 15.8 19.6 23.7 25.2 25.1 
France 18.6 19.2 20.3 21.2 21.5 21.8 22.1 22.0 21.8 21.7 21.4 21.2 21.8 22.4 23.6 23.3 
Germany 16.5 16.5 17.2 17.6 17.0 16.5 16.2 15.9 16.1 16.0 15.7 15.2 14.7 14.8 15.9 16.1 
Ireland 11.3 12.6 13.6 15.6 16.3 16.1 16.6 17.2 16.8 16.2 14.3 14.1 14.9 15.4 15.4 - 
Italy 15.7 14.1 15.7 16.3 17.3 16.7 17.1 17.3 17.3 17.3 17.7 18.2 18.3 19.3 19.5 19.5 
Japan 9.8 10.1 10.6 11.0 11.3 11.1 11.0 11.4 11.8 11.8 11.0 11.5 11.0 11.5 12.1 - 
Netherlands 25.5 25.9 26.9 28.4 28.8 27.5 26.1 25.9 26.4 25.7 25.3 25.8 26.0 26.4 26.7 25.5 
Norway 15.5 14.4 14.5 15.0 15.5 15.0 14.8 15.9 16.3 18.1 19.0 19.5 20.5 - - - 
Sweden 17.6 17.7 18.2 18.4 18.4 17.5 18.2 18.3 18.6 19.5 19.5 19.5 21.1 23.4 25.0 24.9 
Switzerland 13.0 12.7 12.4 13.2 13.5 14.1 13.7 13.6 13.6 13.8 13.4 13.6 14.5 15.9 17.5 17.6 
United Kingdom 11.1 11.5 12.9 13.8 13.8 13.9 13.8 14.0 13.1 12.2 11.9 11.6 13.0 14.4 15.6 15.4 
United States 10.0 10.9 11.1 11.9 11.9 11.0 11.0 11.0 10.8 10.6 10.8 11.2 12.3 13.1 13.2  
 
source: Comparative Welfare State Data Set LIS / OECD (http://lissy.ceps.lu/compwsp.htm) 
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Gross Replacement Rates Unemployment Benefits OECD, 1979-1994 
 
  1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 
                    
Australia 17.3 20.1 17.8 16.1 13.7 13.8 16.4 21.6 24.5 24.9 22.1 22.2 23.5 24.5 24.6 26.5 27.2 27.0 26.2 
Austria 19.9 18.0 16.1 13.3 21.5 23.2 21.1 21.4 25.6 29.3 29.4 25.0 29.4 28.5 29.3 31.2 26.5 25.8 31.0 
Belgium 42.2 37.7 32.5 29.7 40.5 40.8 45.8 47.3 46.8 46.3 44.6 43.6 43.1 42.5 42.1 41.6 40.4 38.7 39.8 
Canada 22.1 21.9 20.9 20.0 22.8 21.2 29.5 28.4 27.5 25.6 25.2 29.3 29.4 29.5 28.8 28.1 27.9 27.2 30.0 
Denmark 19.5 20.5 18.8 21.4 26.6 34.3 35.7 38.7 44.2 49.8 54.2 56.2 53.1 49.4 51.5 51.9 71.0 67.0 66.4 
Finland 4.5 5.0 4.2 3.7 5.7 7.6 28.1 23.9 29.4 26.5 23.7 25.2 34.4 35.9 33.9 38.8 38.7 43.2 35.5 
France 24.6 25.0 24.9 24.5 27.3 24.0 22.6 26.3 24.4 24.0 31.3 30.6 34.4 37.6 36.9 37.6 37.7 37.4 36.5 
Germany 30.4 30.5 30.5 30.0 29.7 29.0 28.1 29.0 29.2 29.9 29.4 28.9 28.1 27.5 27.6 28.8 27.8 26.6 27.1 
Greece 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 9.2 9.2 17.1 22.1 22.1 22.3 
Ireland 16.8 17.1 17.4 17.7 16.4 17.3 15.7 21.3 26.8 28.1 28.1 32.3 28.3 29.8 26.9 29.3 30.8 26.3 30.0 
Italy 4.0 3.0 2.4 2.7 2.4 1.8 1.4 1.9 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 2.7 2.5 16.7 19.3 18.3 
Japan 11.8 12.0 12.1 12.0 12.0 13.4 13.4 13.4 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.7 10.3 10.3 10.0 9.9 9.9 10.2 10.6 
Netherlands 13.2 13.2 48.0 46.3 48.0 48.0 48.0 48.0 48.0 47.5 47.9 47.4 53.8 53.6 53.2 51.3 46.3 45.8 46.9 
New Zealand 42.2 37.9 32.9 32.7 32.2 26.6 27.7 28.3 26.9 26.9 29.0 31.4 31.4 32.5 32.1 30.4 29.8 27.1  - 
Norway 4.2 3.8 3.3 3.7 3.7 5.0 7.9 7.6 20.4 19.9 29.0 29.0 38.9 38.9 38.9 38.9 38.9 38.9 38.9 
Portugal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.4 5.4 7.4 8.6 7.2 21.7 30.7 31.7 34.4 35.4 35.4 33.4 
Spain 9.4 9.4 18.7 18.7 18.7 12.4 12.4 21.4 21.4 21.4 27.9 27.9 34.4 33.8 33.8 33.5 31.7 31.7 31.7 
Sweden 4.0 3.6 5.1 5.0 6.8 6.4 7.2 21.9 23.8 25.1 25.1 28.0 28.0 29.5 28.9 29.4 28.5 27.2 27.6 
Switzerland 1.6 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.6 2.9 7.7 12.9 12.8 12.5 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 29.5 29.5 28.9 
UK 24.0 25.3 25.6 27.6 27.3 25.3 24.4 21.6 25.3 23.8 24.1 21.7 20.7 18.6 17.6 17.8 18.5 17.8 18.8 
US 7.1 10.1 9.0 9.7 9.4 11.2 11.1 12.0 15.4 11.7 14.6 13.8 14.7 11.3 11.4 11.1 11.9 11.9 12.6 
 
note: Replacement rates (i.e. benefits before tax as a percentage of previous earnings before tax) as defined by legislated entitlements averaged across various circumstances in which an 
unemployed person may be. Change equals the change in replacement rates over the time frame indicated. 
 
Explanation: Benefit entitlements have been estimated for two earnings levels (average earnings and two-thirds of average earnings), three family situations (single, with dependent spouse, with 
spouse in work) and three durations of unemployment spells (one year, 2 to 3 years, 4 to 5 years out of work). For every data-year the unweighted averages of these replacement 
rates are computed. The computations assume standard circumstances such as 40 years of age, involuntary loss of the job, long previous work record, etc.  
 
source: OECD (data provided by Glenn Cooper) 
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Social Benefits as % of GDP, 1960-1999 
 
countries 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Austria 7.57 7.59 8.26 8.68 8.91 8.96 9.12 9.84 10.53 11.21 12.25 12.97 13.74 13.91 13.30 13.55 13.87 14.12 14.98 15.51 
Australia 4.92 5.25 5.16 5.54 5.33 5.31 5.61 4.85 4.73 5.10 5.43 5.54 6.26 6.47 6.91 8.45 8.97 9.50 9.44 9.23 
Belgium 11.35 11.00 11.33 11.45 10.89 12.41 12.77 13.00 14.03 13.70 14.08 14.23 14.87 15.43 15.94 18.76 19.27 19.99 20.34 20.85 
Canada 8.02 6.85 6.73 6.48 6.31 6.17 6.14 7.09 7.47 7.59 8.11 8.76 9.40 9.05 9.38 10.29 10.11 10.48 10.77 9.85 
Denmark 6.17 6.19 6.32 6.66 6.21 6.73 7.23 7.99 8.65 8.68 10.41 10.87 10.93 10.67 11.59 13.38 13.13 13.75 14.53 14.96 
Finland 5.08 5.40 5.69 5.73 5.78 6.24 6.80 7.38 7.46 7.08 7.03 7.62 7.84 7.32 7.58 8.24 8.90 9.70 9.88 9.08 
France 12.74 13.33 14.14 13.58 13.90 14.22 14.36 14.49 14.78 14.82 14.80 14.79 14.98 15.14 15.54 17.41 17.33 17.73 18.48 18.63 
Germany 12.83 12.78 12.88 12.99 13.02 13.43 13.77 14.96 13.97 13.53 13.07 13.21 13.71 13.73 14.86 17.92 17.71 17.66 17.25 16.95 
Greece 4.91 5.01 5.73 6.12 6.26 6.82 7.09 7.76 8.03 7.68 7.64 7.69 7.26 6.47 6.85 7.13 7.45 8.23 9.01 8.57 
Ireland 4.07 5.79 5.77 6.46 6.32 6.46 7.46 7.26 7.61 7.76 8.61 9.16 8.79 8.96 10.13 12.28 12.60 11.66 11.36 11.64 
Italy 9.50 9.32 9.78 10.31 10.55 12.04 12.21 11.62 12.18 11.93 11.94 12.63 13.46 13.13 12.79 14.55 14.36 13.89 14.84 14.08 
Japan 3.75 3.72 3.86 4.19 4.32 4.69 4.68 4.48 4.50 4.46 4.63 4.81 5.14 5.15 6.18 7.74 8.49 8.91 9.43 9.84 
Netherlands 7.17 7.22 7.72 9.32 9.38 10.52 11.30 11.70 12.39 12.92 13.37 14.28 15.03 15.31 16.18 17.64 17.70 18.41 19.24 19.93 
Norway 9.34 9.66 10.27 10.53 10.52 10.65 11.00 11.51 11.67 11.87 11.53 11.72 11.47 11.29 11.39 12.30 12.74 12.76 13.34 13.36 
Spain 3.65 3.39 3.14 3.78 4.81 5.10 5.17 5.65 6.15 6.38 6.65 7.42 7.52 7.63 7.65 8.32 8.97 9.31 10.73 11.70 
Sweden 6.09 6.12 6.20 6.51 6.37 6.52 6.82 7.54 8.03 8.19 8.23 8.88 9.27 9.24 11.19 11.29 12.11 13.48 14.20 14.28 
Switzerland 5.94 6.15 6.24 6.22 7.02 7.17 7.25 7.51 7.51 8.54 8.35 8.26 7.85 9.82 10.31 12.09 12.88 13.12 13.07 12.93 
Portugal 2.26 2.34 2.45 2.58 2.72 2.81 2.91 2.70 2.52 2.50 2.55 2.56 3.54 4.05 4.47 6.17 7.06 7.18 7.38 7.03 
United Kingdom 6.06 6.23 6.53 6.96 6.73 7.20 7.36 7.89 8.40 8.35 8.36 8.28 9.03 8.63 9.39 9.71 10.18 10.29 10.60 10.55 
United  States 5.72 6.32 6.06 6.07 5.88 5.85 5.95 6.69 7.03 7.23 8.29 9.06 9.19 9.38 10.32 11.93 11.68 11.19 10.69 10.72 
                     
countries 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Austria 13.10 13.47 13.67 13.79 14.09 14.50 14.66 15.05 14.93 14.71 14.51 14.43 14.51 15.11 15.33 15.54 15.58 15.49 15.79 15.71 
Australia 9.06 9.04 9.61 10.79 10.89 10.77 10.78 10.39 10.04 9.62 10.46 11.73 12.55 12.84 12.74 12.90 13.11 12.87 12.71 12.55 
Belgium 23.39 25.22 25.14 25.86 25.28 22.41 22.11 22.02 21.12 20.62 20.55 21.24 21.51 21.79 21.45 21.49 21.62 21.42 21.29 21.16 
Canada n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Denmark n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 16.97 17.81 17.86 18.38 18.89 19.67 21.23 20.34 19.73 18.80 17.86 16.92 
Finland 11.89 12.09 13.29 14.02 13.97 14.76 15.26 15.37 14.75 14.36 15.75 19.64 23.68 25.23 25.08 23.52 22.61 21.22 19.92 19.54 
France 19.15 20.28 21.23 21.52 21.77 22.07 21.91 21.57 21.42 21.09 21.24 21.76 22.41 23.63 23.28 23.25 23.41 23.62 23.51 23.55 
Germany 17.06 17.57 17.83 17.35 16.73 16.50 16.31 16.59 16.51 16.19 15.67 16.64 17.08 17.89 17.66 17.85 17.61 17.37 17.12 16.70 
Greece 9.47 11.28 13.43 13.73 14.23 15.37 15.40 15.49 15.02 15.49 15.35 15.21 15.16 15.61 15.44 15.76 15.45 15.27 15.43 15.54 
Ireland 13.43 14.38 16.32 16.95 16.77 17.16 17.61 17.33 16.64 14.62 14.27 15.17 15.73 15.79 15.69 15.05 14.98 14.45 13.84 13.64 
Italy 14.19 15.79 16.34 17.31 16.82 17.17 17.24 17.35 17.35 17.61 18.20 18.31 19.34 19.54 19.50 18.90 19.23 19.61 19.46 19.70 
Japan 10.06 10.53 10.96 11.23 10.96 10.90 11.19 11.56 11.29 10.94 11.35 10.82 11.28 11.90 12.47 13.37 13.51 13.78 14.14 14.51 
Netherlands 20.70 21.07 21.56 21.01 20.09 19.50 19.33 19.73 19.59 18.26 19.61 19.98 20.53 20.95 19.73 19.36 18.79 18.98 18.04 17.75 
Norway 11.33 11.63 12.03 12.37 12.09 11.85 12.73 13.18 14.49 15.40 15.95 16.37 17.06 16.93 16.37 15.80 15.18 14.97 15.26 15.35 
Spain 12.36 13.71 13.56 13.96 13.89 14.33 13.96 13.81 13.87 13.94 14.40 15.24 16.09 16.57 16.46 15.74 15.72 15.36 15.19 15.09 
Sweden 14.47 15.18 15.20 15.30 14.68 15.01 15.36 15.60 16.37 16.29 16.32 17.26 18.56 19.96 19.28 18.09 17.49 16.72 16.26 15.82 
Switzerland 12.01 11.91 12.77 13.19 13.54 13.36 13.53 13.63 13.74 13.36 13.39 14.20 15.58 17.08 17.21 17.40 18.51 19.23 20.03 20.07 
Portugal 7.21 8.00 8.21 8.20 8.16 8.06 8.20 8.46 8.46 8.25 8.75 9.67 10.23 11.13 11.78 12.27 12.60 12.62 12.52 12.50 
United Kingdom 10.56 11.81 12.65 12.63 12.76 12.70 12.85 12.00 11.07 10.47 10.69 12.04 13.37 14.03 13.85 13.66 13.42 13.00 13.15 13.12 
United States 11.41 11.58 12.44 12.36 11.48 11.50 11.55 11.37 11.25 11.33 11.83 12.19 13.65 13.83 13.64 13.79 13.86 13.70 13.65 13.75 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, December 1998 (data relating to 1999 are estimates) 
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Net Social Expenditure (Public & Private Mandatory, 1- and 2- digits only) as percentage of GDP, 1980-1996 
 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
                  
AUS 11.74 11.93 12.95 13.48 13.83 13.98 13.84 13.77 12.99 13.27 14.54 15.64 16.55 16.54 16.07 15.73 - 
AUT 23.87 - - - - 25.40 - - - - 25.24 25.45 25.94 27.35 27.63 27.11 - 
BEL 25.59 27.43 28.00 28.36 27.42 28.21 28.21 27.58 27.38 26.46 26.61 27.34 27.77 28.98 28.46 28.78 - 
CAN 13.16 13.68 16.17 16.18 16.02 16.35 16.54 16.12 15.85 16.19 17.56 19.43 20.04 19.99 18.91 18.24 - 
CZE - - - - - - - - - - 15.95 18.94 18.42 19.35 19.62 19.23  
DEN 27.54 27.75 28.04 28.51 27.27 26.36 25.64 26.42 27.73 28.24 28.11 28.99 29.66 31.10 33.00 32.58 31.87 
FIN 18.90 19.46 20.74 21.37 22.29 23.42 23.98 24.38 23.88 23.51 25.18 30.53 34.83 34.95 34.04 32.12 - 
FRA 23.47 25.11 26.10 26.58 26.93 27.02 26.75 26.63 26.45 25.68 26.66 27.31 28.15 29.68 29.70 30.07 - 
GER 25.68 26.50 26.64 25.92 25.54 26.31 26.16 26.53 26.48 25.51 24.82 26.94 28.35 29.22 28.96 29.61 - 
GRE 10.79 11.99 14.33 14.72 15.28 16.23 16.63 16.75 16.42 17.15 17.09 16.90 16.19 16.79 - - - 
ISL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 19.50 19.87  
IRE 17.61 17.74 18.43 18.55 17.94 22.93 23.10 22.25 20.81 19.12 19.23 19.95 20.44 20.41 20.04 19.40 18.38 
ITA 18.37 19.80 20.34 21.38 20.87 21.65 21.78 22.09 22.18 22.41 23.08 24.72 25.72 25.94 25.15 23.71 - 
JPN 9.95 10.42 10.81 11.13 10.96 11.38 11.77 12.01 11.73 11.57 11.34 11.46 12.05 12.63 13.26 14.06  
KOR - - - - - - - - - - 4.10 4.04 4.49 4.69 4.98 5.38 5.60 
LUX 24.52 26.31 25.49 25.68 24.21 24.03 22.99 24.27 23.37 22.73 23.43 24.36 24.26 24.85 24.16 25.24 - 
MEX - - - - - 2.12 2.02 2.37 2.29 2.26 2.78 3.22 3.41 3.40 3.55 3.67 - 
NLD 28.53 29.38 30.99 31.15 29.94 28.87 28.56 28.88 28.51 28.16 29.68 29.77 30.18 30.51 28.97 27.99 26.91 
NZL 16.49 17.10 18.22 17.97 17.03 17.57 17.54 18.64 19.87 21.62 22.24 22.60 22.52 19.14 18.89 18.80 19.22 
NOR 18.79 - - - - 20.04 - - 25.34 26.42 27.05 28.31 29.54 29.22 29.03 28.48 - 
POR 11.57 12.47 11.77 11.88 11.73 11.87 12.75 13.03 13.44 12.97 14.62 15.67 16.41 17.85 18.38 18.64 19.02 
ESPA 16.29 17.47 17.43 18.12 17.82 18.53 18.23 18.15 18.66 18.80 19.59 20.37 21.34 22.42 21.99 21.49 - 
SWE 29.78 30.72 30.94 31.31 30.04 31.10 31.19 31.41 32.01 31.38 32.18 34.31 36.41 37.44 36.29 33.38 - 
CHE 15.91 15.61 16.61 17.45 17.53 17.41 17.70 18.26 18.45 18.28 19.35 20.65 22.52 24.33 24.71 25.22 - 
TUR 3.94 3.74 4.05 4.46 4.13 3.83 4.00 4.14 4.45 4.98 5.85 7.26 6.69 6.54 7.14 6.79 - 
UK 18.32 19.85 20.23 20.93 21.20 21.12 21.36 20.53 19.18 18.82 19.63 21.28 23.02 22.91 23.05 22.79 - 
USA 13.74 13.85 14.17 14.62 13.56 13.41 13.56 13.66 13.63 13.63 14.08 15.23 15.98 16.12 16.13 16.26 - 
 
source: OECD, SOCX Database (downloading 11-1-2001); http://www.oecd.org/els/social 
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